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PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
THE PROPER UNIT OF ANALYSIS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
RYAN CHRISTIAN ELSE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states that an attack is
disproportionate, thus illegal, if it "may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated."' This paper synthesizes rules
usable to a commander to determine ex ante whether an attack meets this
proportionality requirement.
Additionally, this paper draws from multiple sources of international
law, the Protocol I signatories' intent, and state practices in command
responsibility to synthesize a proposed rule in determining whether
incidental civilian losses are excessive relative to the military advantage
gained by a specific tactical operation, a commander may aggregate specific
tactical operations so long as:
(1) the military objective of the specific tactical operations is
limited to a single enemy capability or stronghold, not the strategic
value of the overall campaign;
(2) the military advantage of this objective is not dependent on the
cumulative effect of many attacks, defined as related sets of specific
tactical operations;
(3) the specific tactical operations are geographically and
temporally close enough to allow the commander in immediate
control of the operation to foresee civilian losses and concrete
military advantages while being able to adjust the operations
accordingly; and
1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, art. 51 (5)(b)
(entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
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(4) the target has some value to the overall strategy of the war, and
the strategic objective cannot be met by some other specific tactical
operation that would cause less incidental civilian loss.
This rule seeks a balance between the legal requirement that our
commanders exercise concern for civilians and the duties we impose on
them to accomplish missions in areas of civilian concentration.
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The jus in bellum principle of proportionality in the conduct of armed
conflict can be traced to the seventeenth-century philosopher Hugo Grotius,
who wrote, "[I]t is the bidding of mercy, if not of justice, that except for
reasons that are weighty and will affect the safety of many, no action should
be attempted whereby innocent persons may be threatened with
destruction."' However, throughout both the First and Second World Wars
and most of the twentieth century, this principle was limited in application
to distinguishing between indiscriminate attacks and legitimate military
targets. The principle did not address legitimate military targets that would
result in incidental civilian losses.3 In the early 1970s the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) addressed this issue by holding two
Conferences of Government Experts and drafting two Additional Protocols
to the 1949 Geneva Convention.4 The final rule of proportionality in
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention is stated in terms of the ban
on indiscriminate attacks. This reflects a historical struggle to conceptualize
the difference between a military attack which does not distinguish between
military and civilian targets, and a military attack which is against a
legitimate military target but would create incidental civilian losses.
Additional Protocol I states the rule of proportionality of an attack in
Article 51(5)(b) as follows:
Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate: ... (b) an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.5
For an attack to be legitimate, the attacker must not only discriminate
between military and civilian targets, but also enter into a calculation of
what is an "excessive" loss of civilian life or objects relative to the "military
advantage." These terms are left undefined and the language of "expected"
civilian losses and "anticipated" military advantage indicate this is to be a
2. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 37
(2004).
3. Id. at 90.
4. Id. at 90-91.
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, supra note 1.
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pre-attack calculation rather than a post-attack justification. When coupled
with the stress and speed of the modem battlefield, the ambiguity of what is
an "excessive" civilian loss relative to "military advantage" becomes a
problem for those planning an attack.
Article 51 's language also leaves much open to interpretation. What is
the effect of the "concrete and direct" requirement on military advantage
when the language for incidental loss of life is much more generalized?
Does this mean there is a presumption on the civilian side of the equation?
Even if a commander has the luxury of being able to assign clear values to a
certain military advantage via a certain civilian loss, the commander is left
with the problem of what constitutes an "attack" under Article 51(5). A
single shot from a rifleman would not constitute an attack for this analysis
since any civilian loss would be completely accidental because a soldier
could not legitimately target a civilian. Nor would the military advantage of
a six-month campaign justify a single attack that would otherwise incur
excessive civilian losses. Between these extremes the calculation becomes
much more difficult.
The scarce case law directly addressing this issue illustrates how
difficult this calculation is, especially considering the limited and
ambiguous proportionality principles available. One of the most on-point
modem cases, the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("NATO Prosecutor's Report"), states, "[T]he
proportionality or otherwise of an attack should not focus exclusively on a
specific incident."6 However, the opinion uses an overly broad assessment
of a long-term strategy, "watered down into the context of the entire war
campaign against the C3 network," to justify a series of American attacks
on a Yugoslavian television broadcast facility.7 Even more frustrating is that
little attention was given to explaining the analytical framework used to
assess the attacks, so it is very difficult to form practical rules to shape
future conduct rather than simply to legitimize past conduct.
After identifying the difficult issues presented in proportionality
analysis, such as what to include or exclude and determining standards of
measurement in time and space, the NA TO Prosecutor's Report states "the
answers to these questions are not simple" and should be "resolved on a
case-by-case basis, and the answers may differ depending on the
6. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"): Final Report to the
Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1279-1280 (2000) [hereinafter "NATO Prosecutor's
Report"].
7. Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NA TO Bombing Campaign
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 503, 524 (2001).
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background and values of the decision maker."'8 While it is true that
proportionality analysis is not simple, Additional Protocol I did not intend a
completely subjective standard based on the background and values of the
individual commander. It also cannot be that lawyers are incapable of
distilling concrete rules to guide commanders beyond this over-simplified
case-by-case approach.
Case law provides a scant guide for commanders attempting to make
real world decisions, leaving this difficult issue to academics and military
lawyers. Unfortunately, proportionality calculations cannot be approached
with a simple empirical method of X number of civilian lives must yield X
number of enemy casualties. The weight of a military objective is
inherently subjective and some lives and capabilities on the battlefield are
worth more than others.9 It is essential that we address this difficult issue by
guiding commanders in terms of who makes the decisions and what factors
they must consider in making the decision to attack.
HYPOTHETICAL AND ISSUES PRESENTED
To flush out the difficulty of a military commander's determination of
the proportionality of an attack, let's start with a hypothetical: A legally
valid war has been initiated by the United Nations Security Council
("UNSC") in response to the attempted genocide of a particular ethnic
group in Country A. Country A is threatening to use nuclear weapons to
eradicate the group in neighboring Country B, as well as to attack Country
C if Country C violates the territorial integrity of Country A. Country C's
theater level commander, General X, has been assigned the problem of
invading Country A without allowing Country A to make good on its
threats of nuclear attack. General X decided on an air raid to begin the
attack with the following goals: (1) to eliminate all of Country A's nuclear
capabilities; (2) to eliminate Country A's air-defense, artillery, and
communications to allow follow-on airborne operations; (3) to prevent
Country A from moving its forces while conducting the genocide; and (4)
to strike fear into Country A's senior political and military command by
attacking high value targets with overwhelming displays of force.
Each of these goals has been divided into its own air campaign for
command and control purposes. Four majors are assigned to supervise the
planning and execution of these air campaigns, being told that they must
follow the laws of war and have legal justification for all attacks before they
are executed. These campaigns must be completed within one week of the
start of the war. Finally, the majors assign captains to conduct the specific
8. NATO Prosecutor's Report, supra note 6, at 1271.
9. Richard Jackson, Special Assistant on Law of War Matters, Army Judge Advocate
General Corps, Panelist, Empirical Approaches To The International Law Of War, 16
WILLAMET-rE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 386, 392 (2008) (see also Rule 17.26).
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tactical operations against each target, instructing the captains to act within
the laws of war to provide legal justification for any civilian death that
occurs before the attack.
One campaign, code-named X-Wing is led by Major Y who has
planned a series of 70 attacks within the week in order to accomplish his
campaign goals. Major Y's greatest problem is that Country A's National
Guard has placed his most critical targets in civilian population centers in
which he cannot avoid significant civilian casualties. To make things worse,
these targets are absolutely essential to the success of his campaign; there is
no way for this campaign to be deemed successful without hitting these
targets that were carefully shielded by the unknowing population centers.
For these targets Major Y has assigned his best subordinate, Captain Z,
to conduct the operations. Both Major Y and Captain Z consult military
lawyers to discuss the legality of attacking these targets and are told that the
civilian losses must be in proportion to the military advantage achieved by
the attack. Captain Z takes this new knowledge and tells Major Y that he
cannot conduct these attacks because the immediate military advantage of
the individual attacks will not be proportional to the loss. Major Y responds
that it is the military advantage of the campaign against the group of targets
that must be considered, and the civilian losses in this instance are
proportionate to the overall military advantage gained in the campaign.
However, Major Y goes to General X with one attack that is
particularly troubling to him: a multi-day attack on the most high value
targets in a civilian population outside Major Y's usual geographic area of
operations to be conducted the day after the other operations end. The
targets are essential to the strategic goals listed above, and the follow-on
missions will not succeed if these targets are not attacked. General X thus
informs Major Y that the civilian losses will be proportional to the overall
strategic military advantage of the invasion of Country A.
There are two main issues, each with two sub-issues, in determining the
proportionality of an attack:
1. How do we define an "attack"?
A. Is it determined by the military advantage of the larger
campaign or of a single incident; and
B. If part of a larger campaign, does this logic extend to a theater-
level, strategic command decision, or is it limited to an isolated
group of engagements with the same tactical objective?
2. Once we have defined an "attack," how do we calculate whether the
incidental civilian losses are excessive to the military advantage
gained?
A. How does the type of military objective (i.e., preventing
nuclear retaliation, protecting a threatened group, or preparing
for follow-on operations) affect proportionality analysis when
No. 1]
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the individual attack in question is essential to that military
objective; and
B. How is this proportionality analysis affected by the temporal or
geographic relation of the targets to other related targets?
These are real problems that arise as we demand more from the modem
war-fighter. They are expected to reach every tactical and strategic
objective to protect and promote our interests. But they cannot breach rules
that are ambiguous even for public international law professionals. In
essence, they must serve as the warrior-philosophers, not only experts of
their technical craft, but also capable of justifying the terrible things they
must do in our name. Any war-fighter who honestly exercises this level of
care to prevent civilian losses while accomplishing their mission may not
necessarily be focused on avoiding criminal penalty, since it is unlikely that
a court would try to punish such a good-faith effort. It is more likely he/she
is seeking legitimacy on the modem battlefield, which has become a top
priority in recent counter-insurgency operations. This paper seeks to assist
these brave war-fighters and those who advise them by determining the
proper unit of analysis for calculating the proportionality of military
advantage relative to civilian losses in individual attacks as part of broader
campaigns.
DEFINING AN ATTACK IN PROPORTIONALITY CALCULATIONS
These problems are a direct result of imprecise textual language,
making it difficult to define an "attack" within the meaning of Additional
Protocol I. Article 49 defines "[a]ttacks" as "acts of violence against an
adversary, whether in offence or in defence."'" This broad definition of an
attack indicates that analysis of proportionality would be limited to single
acts because Article 51(5)(b) uses the singular "attack," meaning any one
act of violence against an adversary."' However, the Reservations to Article
51 of Additional Protocol I show this interpretation was not the intent of
many signatories 2 and is inconsistent with much of the case law and
academic interpretations.
For purposes of meaningful discussion, it is necessary to follow with
some common definitions. Webster's Dictionary ("Webster's") provides an
overly broad definition of "attack," so using the term "specific tactical
operation" is more preferable in referring to the individual operation or
smallest logical unit of analysis for proportionality purposes. This is not
I 0. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, supra note 1, art. 49.
11. Id. at art. 51(5)(b).
12. United Kingdom Reservations to Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol 1) 12 Dec. 1977, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/OA9EO3FOF2EE757
CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument [hereinafter "United Kingdom Reservations"].
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limited to the individual rifleman, but includes a concise ground attack by a
small unit or individual bombing by air, artillery or the like against a single
target. Webster's defines a "campaign" as "military operations for a specific
purpose."' 3 While broad, this definition can refer to a collection of specific
tactical operations aimed at the same purpose, such as enemy capability,
and will be a "tactical campaign." Unfortunately, Webster's definition
could also encompass an entire war or pursuit of a strategic objective. This
is the broadest alternative for analysis of an "attack," and will be considered
a "strategic campaign."
The important difference between a tactical campaign and a strategic
campaign is a tactical campaign interpretation is limited to a single and
specific objective and cannot include long-term geo-political or strategic
rationale to justify an attack. A tactical campaign consists of a more limited
time frame and involves a more concise group of attackers, such as a sortie
of air attacks against a specific enemy capability or an infantry assault to
take an individual town. On the other hand, a strategic campaign
interpretation allows aggregation of almost any amount of violence to
justify incidental civilian losses. A strategic campaign is not limited to a
single unit attacking or even a concise time frame since it is the overall
strategic effect that is the focus of the analysis. Unfortunately, there is a
gray area between each of these three terms. We must first look to case law
to come to more useable concepts of what constitutes a proportional attack.
Specific Tactical Tactical Strategic
Operation Campaign Campaign
Definitions Attack on single Collection of Collection of
enemy position, specific tactical tactical
such as a single operations aimed campaigns that
missile/bomb at single enemy seek to meet a
strike capability or goal, strategic goal
such as an air such as
sortie against maintaining
enemy C3 in control of a
certain region or
winning overall
war
13. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 301 (2d ed. 2001).
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Hypothetical Captain Z's Campaign code- General X's four
Illustration individual named X-wing air campaigns,
missions against with series of which only
the individual attacks aimed at derive value in
targets assigned to Country A's Air relation to the
him by Major Y Defense strategic
Capabilities objective of
initiating the
invasion
Unity of Time Limited to single May be multiple No definite unity
and Place of place with limited locations, but of place, targets
Parts of time frame, such within the same can be spread
Operation as a day (timing general geography over entire war
depends on type or area of zone, and time
of target and asset operations, and limitations
used) may take at least a imposed by
week strategic
necessities
Amount of Force Force is limited to Uses multiple Significant
Deployed that needed to strike capabilities amount of force
destroy a single to address for diverse units
target, usually a multiple targets, and capabilities
single plane or may be multiple, available to a
missile, or an planes, working in General Officer
infantry platoon concert with
or company, reasonable
usually led by knowledge of each
Junior Officers other's activities,
usually lead by
Field Grade
Officers
Foreseeable Close connection Foreseeability of Will be difficult
Lethality between total lethality to foresee and
commanders and becomes control casualties
operation make tangential and as General
lethality number of Officer is
foreseeable and casualties will be detached from
number of larger than any operations,
casualties of a one of its number of
relatively limited constituent parts casualties will be
scope IIlarge
Proportionality in the Law ofArmed Conflict
Strategic Rarely will May be significant Is necessary to
Significance significance be enough to affect completing the
such that outcome of the war's political
abandoning the war or require objectives and
one operation will significant sought end-state
greatly affect the restructuring of
outcome of the war objectives
war
Note: This table seeks to distinguish the differences between the different available units of
analysis in the proportionality calculation. There is certainly grey area between these
options, but these coincide with the three grades of officers that will likely be making such
decisions: Junior Grade, Field Grade, and General Officers.
One of the clearest, yet far from definitive, statements of the law as it
stands today came from the NA TO Prosecutor's Report, "the
proportionality or otherwise of an attack should not focus exclusively on a
specific incident."' 4 The specific incident in question was the NATO
bombing of a Serbian TV and radio station that was also part of the Serbian
command and control network. Ten to seventeen civilians were killed in
this attack, but as the above quote indicates, the attack was analyzed as part
of a larger coordinated attack on the Serbian command, control, and
communications (C3) network because "on the same night, radio relay
buildings and towers were hit along with electrical power transformer
stations."15 This sets the precedent that an individually disproportionate
specific tactical operation, analyzed as a "specific incident," may be
proportionate in the context of coordinated attacks within the same day and
with the same military advantage to be gained by the coordinated attacks.
The military advantage of this overall operation is at least as significant as
"disrupting and degrading the C3 . . . network,"' 6 since the C3 capabilities
of an enemy is one of the highest value targets of any military campaign.
The incidental civilian losses are measured relevant to the military
advantage of a tactical campaign as defined above.
Unfortunately, this report gave little reasoning and based its decision
primarily on the reasoning found in United Nations Prosecutor v.
Kupreskik. KupreskiW applied the logic of collective military attacks to state
that a group of attacks may be disproportionate even if their parts were
proportionate if the sum total of civilian losses was excessive. The NATO
Prosecutor's Report concluded this logic must also work in the opposite
direction: If the total military advantage of a group of attacks are
14. NATO Prosecutor's Report, supra note 6, at 1279-1280.
15. Id. at 1277.
16. Id.
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proportionate, a single disproportionate incident within the group may be
justified. Yet, Kupreskik may not support this rationale. In the paragraph
immediately preceding the one cited in the NATO Prosecutor's Report, the
Kupreski6 court analyses of the Martens Clause, 7 which was first set forth
in the preamble of the 1899 Hague Convention of Law of War on Land, to
dictate:
[T]he prescriptions of Articles 57 and 58 [of the Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions] (and of the corresponding customary
rules) must be interpreted so as to construe as narrowly as possible
the discretionary power to attack belligerents and, by the same
token, so as to expand the protection accorded to civilians.'8
According to this language, the NA TO Prosecutor's Report improperly
uses the Martens Clause reasoning of Kupreski6 to expand military
discretion and decrease protection for civilians by permitting a commander
to justify civilian losses in an individual attack via the military advantage of
multiple attacks. Rather, Kupreski's reasoning would dictate that the
smallest unit of analysis, the individual specific tactical operation, must be
used independent of its larger context since this would give commanders
the narrowest discretionary power to attack, and thus provides the most
expanded protection of civilians. When applied to our hypothetical above,
this rule would force Major Y to cancel, or Captain Z to refuse to conduct,
all of the attacks against targets that would incidentally harm civilians
since, when taken out of the context of collective mission, it would likely be
difficult to say the civilian losses were worth, for example, one bridge. This
reasoning seems to be an unworkable solution, which may explain the
attempt of the NATO Prosecutor's Report to bend this reasoning in another
direction.
However, the Kupreski6 analysis is in conflict with other sources of the
law of proportionality in the law of armed conflict, primarily the apparent
intent of the signatories to Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Ten of the
signatories-Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom-made
reservations to Articles 51 and 57 very similar to that of the United
Kingdom. The reservation states, "[T]he military advantage anticipated
from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the
17. The Martens Clause states, "Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the
High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the
principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized
nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience." Fyodor
Fyodorovich Martens, Russian Delegate, Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (Hague II), 1899.
18. United Nations Prosecutor v. Kupreskid, Case No., Judgment, IT-95-16-T, 525 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 14, 2000) (emphasis added).
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attack considered as a whole and not only from isolated or particular parts
of the attack."' 9 The issue is framed in the same light in the military
manuals of most Western Countries as well. For example, the United
Kingdom's Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict states, "[I]t is generally
accepted that the use of force must be proportionate to its overall
objective."2° The ICRC's survey of military manuals shows that the
Australian Defence Force Manual, the Belgian Law of War Manual, the
Canadian Law of Armed Conflict Manual, the German Military Manual, the
Nigerian Military Manual, the Spanish LOAC Manual, and the United
States Naval Handbook all frame proportionality analysis in terms of an
attack "as a whole," and not from isolated parts of an operation.2
Furthermore, the ICRC commentary to Article 57 of Protocol I states,
It goes without saying that an attack carried out in a concerted
manner in numerous places can only be judged in its entirety.
However, this does not mean that during such an attack actions may
be undertaken which would lead to severe losses among the civilian
population or to extensive destruction of civilian objects. Nor does
it mean that several clearly distinct military objectives within an
urban area may be considered as a single objective. This would be
contrary to Article 5 1.22
This leads to the reasonable inference that the signatories intended that,
when deciding if the military advantage of an attack is proportionate to the
civilian losses, the proper unit of analysis is not a single incidence of
violence on the battlefield. This interpretation of the rule is strengthened by
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), which
makes it a war crime to:
intentionally [launch] an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.23
Beyond this, the language of an "attack considered as a whole" and "overall
military advantage" does not provide useful guidance as to what limits there
are to aggregating these incidences. In the hypothetical, this rule would only
19. United Kingdom Reservations, supra note 12.
20. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 26 (2004).
21. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 2 PRACTICE 328-329 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
22. International Committee of the Red Cross ["ICRC"] Commentary, Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 2218 (1977) [hereinafter "ICRC Commentary"].
23. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (entered into force
Jul. 1, 2002), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E
16/0/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf [hereinafter "Rome Statute"] (emphasis added).
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inform our commanders that they do not have to limit their analysis to the
instant military advantage of the particular attack in question, so the Major
was correct in his orders to the Captain. While helpful, this does not inform
the Major whether all the attacks in question can be aggregated into the
one-week tactical campaign or if the aggregation is limited to a grouping
connected by time, space, or mission type. It also fails to inform the
General the degree to which the type of military objective, as well as its
importance in the overall strategy of the war effort, fits into his analysis.
Whether the proportionality of an attack should be determined by the
military advantage of the larger campaign, of which the attack is a part, or
of the attack as a single incident, it seems apparent that the rule allows for
the use of military advantage gained to extend beyond a single occasion to
justify an incidental civilian loss. Beyond this point, courts have relied upon
a "totality of the circumstances" approach in the few cases that address this
issue. For example, in Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") stated, "in
determining whether an attack was proportionate it is necessary to examine
whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the
actual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to
him or her, could have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from
the attack."24 Since case law is relatively thin on the proper extent of
aggregating military advantage, scholarly work and state practice must
guide further analysis around three issues: the extent of proper aggregation
of incidents of violence in determining military advantage and civilian
losses; whether the nature of the military objective to be achieved effects
this analysis; and how geographically and temporally related targets must
be in order to be properly aggregated.
LIMITS ON AGGREGATING MILITARY OBJECTIVES
The rule of proportionality was not commonly distinguished from the
rule of discrimination prior to 1977 when the Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions were enacted.25 Since that time, major conflicts have
yielded some information as to the practice of states in calculating the
proportionality of an attack, in particular the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999
Kosovo Bombings because these wars were fought with a conscious effort
to minimize and justify civilian losses.
During the first Gulf War, at the individual attack level, operational
commanders showed a fair degree of restraint when they had doubts about
their abilities to avoid civilian casualties. Aircraft commanders were
24. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment & Opinion, 58 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 5, 2003) (emphasis added).
25. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD, 90-97 (2d ed. 2004).
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instructed to return to base without attacking if they could not hit a
designated target safely. On at least two occasions the Royal Air Force
refused to bomb targets due to the incidental civilian loss anticipated. 6 At
the higher levels of command, however, less discipline may have been
exercised in giving an honest assessment of proportionality. Judith Gardam
uses the Annual Defense Report to Congress' article, The Conduct of the
Persian Gulf War, to reach the conclusion that "it was the military
advantage of the destruction of the overall target that was included in the
proportionality equation and not that of each strike against each component
of the target"27 in the first Gulf War. Gardam provides a rare glimpse into
the war-fighter's perception of proportionality when she quotes the Defense
Report as saying that the targets that were canceled due to anticipated
civilian losses "were not fundamental to the timely achievement of the
victory. Had that been the case, irrespective of collateral damage that might
have resulted, one would have to have been responsible for accepting those
targets and for going against them."28 Such reasoning, which allowed for
the aggregate military advantage to outweigh and justify the civilian losses,
may be a valid method of analysis only if applied equally to aggregate the
civilian losses, as well. However, in this same war "the combined effects of
the attacks on [infrastructure targets leading to great civilian losses] is also
not factored into the determination of what is likely to constitute 'excessive'
collateral injury to civilians. The destruction of each target is assessed
individually rather than as a part of the broader picture."29 Whatever the
proper unit of analysis may be, this inconsistent application of the rule of
proportionality does not align with either the letter or the spirit of the rule
and must be avoided. Such inconsistencies in proportionality analysis by
commanders on the ground is not surprising, given the little guidance the
Military Manuals on the law of war provide them and their legal advisors.
As cited above, the United States Naval Handbook gives no guidance
beyond analyzing an attack "taken as a whole,"3 and the Law of War
Handbook published by the United States Judge Advocate General's School
quotes Article 51(5)(b) of General Protocol I and provides an example for
commanders which addresses individual targets, but does not provide any
further guidance on how a commander considers a target in relation to other
targets or campaign objectives.3'
Both Judith Gardam and A.P.V. Rogers analyze the Kosovo bombing
26. Id.
27. GARDAM, supra note 2, at 114.
28. Id. at 118.
29. Id. at 119.
30. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 21, at 329.
31. MAJOR DEREK GRIMES ET AL., THE LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 166-67 (Major Keith E.
Puls ed., International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal
Center and School 2005).
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campaign on a strategic level, noting that with between 10,000 and 14,000
strike sorties there were only about 500 civilian deaths. These statistics
seem to show that immense care was given by the NATO commanders in
avoiding civilian casualties, but it reveals little as to how the proportionality
of an attack was accounted for by these commanders. The bombing of the
Serbian television station cited above shows that the commanders used
aggregated missions within the same day and with the same overall mission
objective, a view validated by the NATO Prosecutor's Report.32 This is a
more disciplined approach than the strategic level aggregation of military
advantage and the disaggregation of civilian losses shown in the First Gulf
War less than a decade earlier. Additionally, this shows a small trend
toward limiting the aggregation of military advantage and civilian losses
that are reasonably related in time and military objective, but more research
and case studies are necessary to establish any sort of state practice
resulting in a customary norm.
GEOGRAPHIC AND TEMPORAL RELATION OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES-
FORESEEABILITY STANDARD
Since it seems clear that at least some aggregation of single military
operations is appropriate when determining the military advantage relative
to civilian losses, it seems logical that such operations would have to be
somewhat related in time and space. Without some relation, a commander
would be free to say that if the war itself were just, and the overall civilian
losses were not excessive to the aims of the entire war, then the attacks are
proportional. This seems outside of thejus in bellum rule of proportionality
since it would rely almost completely on the jus ad bellum legality of the
war.
Despite the centrality of the relationship to determining the
proportionality of an "attack," the necessary temporal and geographic
relation of military operations and targets is not well established. As shown
above in the NATO bombing of the Serbian television station, the one-day
collective attack on an enemy's C3 capabilities may be evaluated as a single
"attack." However, there was no indication of a spatial limitation or
whether a day was a lower or upper limit on such an aggregation of targets.
The ICRC Commentary to Article 57 of Protocol I to the Geneva
Convention indicates that there should be a close relation between targets in
a proportionality calculation, "The expression 'concrete and direct' was
intended to show that the advantage concerned should be substantial and
relatively close, and that advantages which are hardly perceptible and those
which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded."33 It is not
32. NATO Prosecutor's Report, supra note 6, at 1279-80.
33. ICRC Commentary, supra note 22, at 2209.
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clear if this comment refers to the physical characteristics such as time and
space or to the strategic value of the targets relative to one another. Judith
Gardam concluded it is the latter, stating that this was meant to "ensure that
the assessment of military advantage is in the relatively short term rather
than to allow for the inclusion of the long-term cumulative impact of
attacks."34 This shows that the military advantage must be narrowly
construed relative to the civilian losses, and does not speak directly to the
issue of time and space. Thus the ICRC commentary leaves little
substantive guidance on the necessary spatial or temporal relation of
attacks.
A.P.V. Rogers provides a reasonable approach to these issues, "[T]he
answer probably is that it does not matter so long as the same timescale is
applied to both [the humanitarian and military] limbs."35 This seems like a
workable rule for both temporal and geographic analysis as long as it is kept
within reason, since consistency would allow for accountability of decision
makers either way. For example, in our hypothetical all the initial
operations were within one week of each other and all within Country A,
except for the attack on which the Major challenged the General. As long as
both the civilian losses (humanitarian limb) and the military advantages
(military limb) were kept within this week of operations it would seem
reasonable for a commander to analyze them as a whole, at least in terms of
their relation in time and space, since that individual commander would be
accountable for a discrete number of civilian losses relative to what is still a
narrowly identifiable military advantage.
Compare this to the unreasonable use of an entire war in the Kosovo
example discussed above where as many as 14,000 sorties flown in the four
month bombing campaign have been used to show proportionality. In this
case, both the humanitarian and military limbs are evaluated on an equal
timescale and within the same geographic boundaries of the conflict. It
seems less reasonable, though, because it is less likely that a commander in
the planning stage could have foreseen a discrete number of civilian
casualties relative to a narrowly identifiable military advantage in a way
that would keep individual commanders accountable for the decision to go
forward with an individual attack despite incidental civilian losses.
It seems that temporal and geographic relationship is only important if
it becomes of such a broad scope that a reasonable commander can no
longer foresee the incidental civilian costs relative to the military advantage
that the commander perceives in a relatively narrow sense. If multiple
attacks are so separated in either time or space to not allow the commander
in immediate control of the operation to foresee the civilian losses and the
34. GARDAM, supra note 2, at 103.
35. ROGERS, supra note 25, at 22.
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concrete military advantages during the planning of an operation, then these
attacks must not be aggregated for proportionality purposes. This would
also imply that if attacks are not planned, then at the same time they cannot
be aggregated, since the commander could not foresee them as a whole.
Applied to the hypothetical, this would still allow the Major to justify the
attacks to the Captain since the Captain would be able to see the concrete
terms in which the decision was being made, i.e. the civilian losses relative
to the short-term goal of destroying Country A's air-defenses.
Such a foreseeability test also indicates a problem of whose perspective
is relevant to this analysis since, "it is unlikely that a human rights lawyer
and an experienced combat commander would assign the same relative
values to military advantage and to injury to non-combatants. 3 6 It is just as
unlikely that they would have the same ability to foresee the results of an
attack. For this legal standard to be applicable it must be the judgment and
capabilities of a reasonable military commander in the same position, since
it will be military commanders and not human rights lawyers making these
decisions when it matters the most. This foreseeability test also makes sense
for applying the rule to the practical circumstances of war since an infantry
commander in an urban firefight will have a much more narrow view of his
mission's relation to others both geographically and temporally than an Air
Force commander in charge of a large-scale bombing campaign.
THE TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC RELATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
The relatively loose foreseeability standard of time and space needed in
order to be aggregated as an "attack" means that the substantive relationship
must be more significant if we are to limit a commander's ability to justify
an incidental civilian loss within a reasonable standard. The ICRC
commentary to Article 57 of Protocol I speaks directly to the limits on the
analysis of proportionality of an attack, saying "this article, like Article 51
'(Protection of the civilian population),' is not concerned with strategic
objectives but with the means to be used in a specific tactical operation. 3 7
This means that an individual military operation cannot be justified by its
role in the "big-picture" strategic goals of the war, such as the overall
attempt at regime change in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Rather, this language
indicates that it would, at most, be appropriate to consider missions aimed
at a single enemy capability or stronghold (such as air-defense) during a
certain period (i.e., not attacks on air defense capabilities at separate
periods in the war) as a single attack since these would be the upper limits
of what could be considered a "specific tactical operation." For the
36. W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionality During the NATO Bombing Campaign
Against Yugoslavia, 12 EURO. J. INT'L. L. 489, 499 (2001).
37. ICRC Commentary, supra note 22, at 2207.
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hypothetical, this would mean Major Y could justify the civilian losses of
an individual bombing within the week-long air-raid via the military
advantage of, for example, eliminating Country A's C3 capabilities within
that one week of attacks since these missions have a singular tactical goal
and are part of a continuous-reasonable period within the war. The
reasonableness of this relationship is best determined by the foreseeability
test discussed above. However, Major Y could not use the justification that
these acts were essential to the overall war efforts or to the capitulation of
Country A's political leadership.
So, the costs and benefits of individual military missions may be
aggregated up to a point, and that point may not go beyond a singular
tactical objective or the discreet results which are foreseeable to the
commander at the time of planning. While this may seem clear, some
commanders may argue that tactical objectives overlap or can only be
realized on a cumulative basis, such as the defoliation of South Vietnam by
the US in the 1960s.38 In this case, a mission would consist of multiple
sortie strikes with chemical agents that would destroy leaves in the forests
used as cover by the Vietcong, and it would cause severe civilian loss, both
in lives and objects. It would be improper to analyze the proportionality of
the defoliation campaign as a whole in terms of the military advantage
gained from the cumulative effects of the many defoliation missions run
during the war.3 9 Rather, the military advantage would have to be calculated
by the anticipated foreseeable military advantage of the defoliation
achieved in a certain area subject to one tactical mission, which may consist
of multiple sorties. In more precise terms, the military advantage must be
immediately foreseeable from the mission as the commander plans the
individual operation, and not justified in terms of what will happen in
multiple missions of the same sort that are continually run throughout the
war.
STRATEGIC VALUE OF A MILITARY OBJECTIVE
So far we can infer the rule that, in determining whether incidental
civilian losses are excessive relative to the military advantage gained by an
attack, a commander may aggregate individual military operations so long
as (1) the military objective of the missions is limited to a single enemy
capability or stronghold; (2) the military advantage of this objective is not
dependent on the cumulative effect of many attacks, defined as related sets
of missions; and (3) the attacks are geographically and temporally close
enough to allow the commander in immediate control of the operation to
foresee the civilian losses and the concrete military advantages and be able
38. GARDAM,supra note 2, at 101.
39. Id.
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to adjust the operations accordingly. These can be summarized,
respectively, as principles of discreteness of substantive relationship,
immediacy, and foreseeability. The final factor which must be accounted
for is primacy, the strategic value of the military objective as determined
through aggregation of the three principles of analysis.
At first glance the requirement that the analysis be focused solely on the
"specific tactical operation"4 seems to eliminate the need for determining
primacy, but a specific tactical operation which contributes little to the
overall war effort while causing incidental civilian losses may not be
logically or reasonably justified if the operation has no long term value
even if it has immediate value. In the hypothetical above, one objective was
to prevent Country A from moving its forces while conducting the
genocide. Even if the operations to complete this objective met the
requirements of the substantive relationship, immediacy, and foreseeability
tests, it would make little sense to say that this objective could involve very
much incidental loss of life because the ethnic group's protection is the goal
of both missions and the overall war.
The same logic does not apply to the other missions since a short-term,
incidental loss of life may save more lives if Country A's genocide is
stopped. If the military objective is a final target in a long war, such as
opposing commands' last communication link to its forces, incidental
civilian losses may be more acceptable than when that target was just one of
many such targets. The strategic value of a military objective cannot be
completely irrelevant.
There is only one way to make this observation compatible with the
rule that strategic attacks must be justified as specific tactical operations
absent a cumulative effect: a target must have some value to the overall
strategy of the war, and this particular strategic goal cannot be met by
another specific tactical operation that would cause less incidental civilian
loss, respectively the principles of primacy and necessity. This does not
allow a commander to justify incidental civilian losses with a military
advantage, but forms a negative duty to not conduct operations that would
cause incidental civilian losses if those operations do not meet the needs of
the overall war effort. Examples of such operations would include missions
aimed at the protection of a group of people that would be harmed by the
missions themselves or distraction missions that serve little purpose in the
overall war effort. The specific tactical operation must exhibit primacy and
necessity in addition to a discrete substantive relationship, immediacy, and
foreseeability.
40. ICRC Commentary, supra note 22, at 2207.
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CONCLUSION: INFERENCES ABOUT THE RULE OF PROPORTIONALITY
The rule of proportionality, while ambiguous in its codified terms, can
be summarized as follows: in determining whether incidental civilian losses
are excessive relative to the military advantage gained by a specific tactical
operation, a commander may aggregate individual military operations so
long as:
(1) the military objective of the specific tactical operations is
limited to a single enemy capability or stronghold, not the
strategic value of the overall campaign;
(2) the military advantage of this objective is not dependent on the
cumulative effect of many attacks, defined as related sets of
specific tactical operations;
(3) the attacks are geographically and temporally close enough to
allow the commander in immediate control of the operation to
foresee civilian losses and concrete military advantages and be
able to adjust the operations accordingly;
(4) the target has some value to the overall strategy of the war and
the strategic objective cannot be met by some other specific
tactical operation that would cause less incidental civilian loss.
Finally, when a commander provides an aggregate justification for an
attack, a subordinate may only refuse to conduct the specific tactical
operation if any of these factors are clearly absent. This interpretation of the
rule of proportionality balances protecting civilians on the battlefield, as
required by international regimes such as the Rome Statute4' and Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 42 and the military necessity for a
commander to strike essential targets that are located near civilian
populations. Any commander who calculates the proportionality of an
attack has evidenced a good faith effort to practice the duty to spare
civilians and civilian objects in the conduct of military operations as much
as possible, 43 and should be commended, not punished.
41. Rome Statute, supra note 23.
42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, supra note 1.
43. ICRC Commentary, supra note 22, at 2215.
No. 1]
